WHICH SPOUSE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SCHOOL REGISTRATION PROCEDURES
IMPORTANT SUPREME COURT RULING ON WHICH SPOUSE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SCHOOL ENROLLMENT PROCEDURES
In this week's article, I will endeavor to explain to my dear readers, with examples, a landmark ruling by the Supreme Court that serves as a precedent regarding which spouse is held responsible for school enrollment procedures.
The Supreme Court has issued a precedent-setting decision regarding which spouse is responsible for school enrollment fees. The Supreme Court General Assembly of Civil Chambers ruled that "it cannot be accepted that the spouse who carries out the school enrollment procedure is jointly and severally liable to the school alongside the non-litigant spouse."
In the lawsuit petition submitted by the plaintiff to the Civil Court of First Instance, it was alleged that the defendant company, owner of a private school, had initiated enforcement proceedings without a judgment against the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that their spouse had enrolled their joint children in the school without the plaintiff's consent, that the plaintiff, not having signed any contract, had objected to the payment order, and that the proceedings had become final after the objection was rejected. The plaintiff further argued that although it was stated in informal discussions that proceedings would not continue against the plaintiff as they were not a party to the contract, the defendant's initiation of proceedings against a person who was not a party to the contract based on family law provisions was unjust and made in bad faith. The plaintiff requested a determination of non-indebtedness regarding the Küçükçekmece 3rd Enforcement Office file numbered 2014/11.74.
With the decision of the Küçükçekmece 1st Civil Court of First Instance dated 05.04.2016, the case was dismissed on procedural grounds due to the lack of a mandatory requirement regarding jurisdiction. Following the finalization of the decision, the file was sent to the authorized and competent court upon the plaintiff's request, and the lawsuit petition was served to the defendant after this stage.
The defendant argued for the dismissal of the case, stating that the proceedings were initiated for the school fees of the joint children of the plaintiff and the non-litigant spouse, that the claim that the children were enrolled without the plaintiff's consent was untrue and made in bad faith, that the debt arose directly from the law rather than the contract, and that it was not denied that the educational service was provided.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE DECIDED TO ACCEPT THE CASE
With the decision of the Court of First Instance dated 01.06.2017, the case was accepted on the grounds that only the non-litigant Mehmet A. was a party to the contract dated 15.09.2013, which was the basis of the proceedings initiated against the plaintiff and their spouse; that the plaintiff could not be held responsible for a debt related to a contract to which they were not a party; and furthermore, that there was no approval of liability nor a decision taken within the framework of Article 327 of Law No. 4721.
The defendant filed an appeal against the aforementioned decision of the Court of First Instance within the legal time limit.
THE REGIONAL APPEALS COURT DECIDED TO DISMISS THE CASE
The Regional Appeals Court, in its decision dated 08.02.2018, stated that although the plaintiff claimed that their non-litigant spouse had enrolled the joint children in the defendant institution without their consent, the plaintiff could not claim or prove that they had requested judicial intervention under Articles 190 and 195 of Law No. 4721 regarding the enrollment alleged to be without consent. Consequently, as a contract made or a debt undertaken by one of the spouses is binding for both the mother and father, and given that the defendant educational institution relied on educational debt for the years 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 as the cause of the debt in the enforcement file rather than the contract, and that the receipt of educational services was undisputed; furthermore, since Article 327, paragraph two of Law No. 4721 explicitly stipulates that the expenses necessary for the care, education, and protection of the child shall be covered by the mother and father, the plaintiff is responsible for the joint child's educational expenses. Therefore, the Court of Appeals accepted the defendant counsel's appeal, overturned the Court of First Instance's decision, and ruled to dismiss the case on the grounds that it was not correct for the court to accept the case with the written reasoning without taking into account the provisions of the aforementioned article.
The plaintiff's counsel filed an appeal against the aforementioned decision of the Regional Appeals Court within the legal time limit.
THE 3RD CIVIL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL APPEALS COURT.
The 3rd Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court reversed the decision with the reasoning: "... Although the decision to dismiss the case was made on the grounds that it is clear beyond doubt under Article 327 of the Turkish Civil Code (TMK) that the expenses necessary for the care, education, and protection of the child shall be covered by the mother and father, the provision in Article 327 of the TMK regulates the obligations of the mother and father towards the child and does not mean that they will be jointly and severally liable for debts to third parties. It is understood that the contracts subject to the enforcement proceedings were concluded between the defendant company and the non-litigant Mehmet A. The rights and obligations arising from the contract and the right to any claims related to the contract belong to the parties to the contract. For this reason, interpreting Family Law rules in a way that invalidates the principle of relativity of contracts is incorrect, and while the Regional Appeals Court should have rejected the defendant's appeal, its decision to dismiss the case by overturning the Court of First Instance's decision based on written grounds is contrary to procedure and law, requiring reversal."
The Regional Appeals Court rendered a decision of resistance by repeating its previous reasoning, and the file was moved to the agenda of the Supreme Court General Assembly of Civil Chambers.
THE SUPREME COURT GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF CIVIL CHAMBERS HAS RULED
Addressing the file, the Supreme Court General Assembly of Civil Chambers included the following statements in its reversal decree:
“In the concrete case, the school enrollment process, which is the subject of discussion, is a situation where the parent performing the act enters into debt as the legal representative of the child within the framework of custody rights, and it is assumed by presumption that they acted with the consent of the other spouse. However, this situation, as explained in detail above, is not related to an ordinary decision that a spouse can perform without the knowledge and consent of the other, nor can it be evaluated as a continuous need of the marital union, as it imposes significantly more on the marital union than the daily living needs of the family in economic terms.
For this reason, it cannot be said that the non-litigant father exercised ordinary representation authority within the framework of the first paragraph of Article 188 of the Law. It is also not a matter of dispute that the conditions required by the legislator regarding extraordinary representation are not present in the concrete case. In a situation where the article regarding ordinary representation of the marital union does not become operational, it is also not a matter of discussion whether there is a request regarding the restriction or removal of the representation authority granted by this article. In light of all these matters, it cannot be accepted that the plaintiff is jointly and severally liable to the defendant alongside the non-litigant spouse who performed the school enrollment, based on Article 188 of Law No. 4721.”